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EM3TY RITUALS OR WOR.ABLE MODELS" TOWARDS A 
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY 
 
 
JOLYON FORD AND CLAIRE METHVEN O’BRIEN  
 
I   INTRODUCTION  
Within the still-emerging field of business and human rights (µBHR’), the 
question of whether a treaty is required in order meaningfully to address BHR 
µgovernance gaps’1 is one that is attracting renewed advocacy, commentary and 
diplomatic activity. By contrast, when the United Nations (µUN’) Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (µUNGPs’) were first adopted in 2011, 
the balance of opinion amongst duty-bearers appears to have been that this issue 
should be set aside.2 At any rate, the Human Rights Council appeared to accept at 
that time that its immediate focus should instead be on promoting national-level 
implementation of the UNGPs. This was not an unreasonable position since the 
premise of the UNGPs, and of the UN µProtect, Respect, Remedy’ Framework 
from which they proceeded, 3  was that they merely re-articulated the 
                                                 
  Associate Professor, Australian National University. 
  Strategic Advisor, Danish Institute of Human Rights and Research Fellow, University of Groningen, 
Department of International Law. 
  Both authors thank the editors, and wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for comprehensive input. 
1  John Ruggie, Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights (W W Norton, 2013) xxiii 
see generally John Ruggie, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Interim Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/97 (22 February 2006) 4±9 >9@±>30@ (µInterim 
Report’).  
2  John Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, UN Doc 
A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011) (µRuggie Report’) annex, adopted by the Human Rights Council: Human 
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, HRC Res 17/4, UN GAOR, 17th 
sess, 33rd mtg, Agenda Item 3, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/17/4 (6 July 2011, adopted 16 June 2011) (µGuiding 
Principles Resolution’). See also John Ruggie, µTreaty Road Not Travelled’ >2008@ (May) Ethical 
Corporation 42. 
3  John Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: Protect, Respect, Remedy: A 
Framework for Business and Human Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/8/5 (7 April 2008) (µProtect, Respect, 
Remedy Report’), adopted by the Human Rights Council: Mandate of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, HRC Res 8/7, UN GAOR, 8th sess, 28th mtg, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/8/7 (18 June 2008) 
(µProtect, Respect, Remedy Framework Resolution’). 
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contemporary implications of duties arising under existing human rights laws and 
that no supplementary legal basis either authorising or obliging states to 
implement them was required.  
At the same time, the Human Rights Council acknowledged that the UNGPs’ 
arrival might not entirely preclude discussions of how international legal 
frameworks could further evolve in the longer term to address business-related 
challenges to human rights.4 In the event, the question of further µenhancement’ 
of the UNGPs was revived sooner than many anticipated. A resolution narrowly 
adopted in the Human Rights Council in 2014 created an Open-ended 
Intergovernmental Working Group (µOEIWG’) µto elaborate an international 
legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the 
activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises’. 5  This 
mandate, which both resulted from and further stimulates debate of the  
treaty question, also means that attention has been turning, albeit gradually  
and somewhat fitfully,6 from whether any treaty should be transacted to what 
particular form it might take.  
In this article, we do not seek to engage directly with ongoing discussions 
regarding the potential merits, and conversely the risks, of seeking to conclude a 
BHR treaty at all.7 Instead, our aim is to promote a greater focus, in the context 
                                                 
4  The Council stated that the UNGPs were adopted µwithout foreclosing any other long-term development, 
including « enhancement of standards’, and acknowledged the possibility that µfurther efforts to bridge 
governance gaps’ were necessary, including at the international level: Guiding Principles Resolution, UN 
Doc A/HRC/RES/17/4, para 4, Preamble para 6. See also Ruggie Report, UN Doc A/HRC/17/31, 5 >13@. 
5  Elaboration of an International Legally Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights, HRC Res 26/9, UN GAOR, 26th sess, 37th mtg, 
Agenda Item 3, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/26/9 (14 July 2014, adopted 26 June 2014) para 1 (µOEIWG 
Resolution’) (sponsored by Ecuador and South Africa, co-sponsored by Bolivia, Cuba and Vene]uela). 
The OEIWG is mandated to engage in µconstructive deliberations on the content, scope, nature and form 
of the future international instrument’ and µprepare elements for the draft legally binding instrument for 
substantive negotiations’: at paras 3±4. A parallel Norwegian-sponsored resolution was adopted without a 
vote which did not provide explicitly for any treaty process: Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and other Business Enterprises, HRC Res 26/22, UN GAOR, 26th sess, 39th mtg, Agenda 
Item 3, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/26/22 (15 July 2014, adopted 27 June 2014) (µHuman Rights and 
Transnational Corporations Resolution’). It is not necessary here to consider the reasons for these 
parallel developments: see generally International Commission of Jurists, µNeeds and Options for a New 
International Instrument in the Field of Business and Human Rights’ (Report, June 2014) (µICJ Report’) 
Jolyon Ford, µBusiness and Human Rights: Emerging Challenges to Consensus and Coherence’ (Briefing 
Paper, Chatham House, Royal Institute of International Affairs, February 2015). For a summary of the 
adoption of both resolutions, see Irene Pietropaoli, µHigh Tide in Lake Geneva: Business and Human 
Rights Events at the 26th Session of the UN Human Rights Council’, Business and Human Rights 
Resource Centre (online), 27 June 2014 <https://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/ 
highBtideBinBlakeBgeneva.pdf>. 
6  For example, while the Russian Federation voted in favour of the OEIWG’s creation, at the 2nd session its 
delegation made oral comments suggesting that discussion of a BHR treaty remained premature because a 
longer period was required before the efficacy of the UNGPs could be properly evaluated: see Opening of 
Session – 1st Meeting, 2nd Session of Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational 
Corporations (UN Web TV, 2016) 1:31:50±1:37:10. 
7  See, eg, Institute for Human Rights and Business, µBusiness and Human Rights Treaty’ (Blog Series, 3 
June 2014 ± 3 July 2015) <http://www.ihrb.org/tags.html?tag business+and+human+rights+treaty> (now 
republished as individual commentaries). See also Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, µDebate 
the Treaty’ (Blog Series, 2015±2017) <http://business-humanrights.org/en/about-us/blog/debate-the-
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of the BHR treaty debate, on regulatory effectiveness. That is, we believe that 
proposals for a BHR treaty should be assessed in terms of their likely efficacy, 
relative to other available forms of regulatory intervention, in advancing effective 
enjoyment of human rights in the business context. Whereas many contributions 
to the BHR treaty debate so far have explicitly or implicitly advocated one or 
other treaty model they have side-stepped the difficult question of how 
practically effective these models might be in influencing the conduct of duty 
bearers. A lengthy 2014 International Commission of Jurists (µICJ’) report on the 
topic, for example, declined to evaluate the potential impact of a BHR treaty on 
state compliance or business engagement with human rights.8 Instead, the report 
opted to µ>set@ aside’ consideration of µdeficiencies in the practical application of 
standards’9 its finding that a new instrument had µclear potential to be effective’10 
thus ranking as mere assertion.  
While advocating greater discussion of the question of regulatory 
effectiveness in the context of BHR treaty debates,11 we do not attempt here to 
advance a comprehensive analysis of all BHR treaty models from that 
perspective, albeit such an endeavour is warranted. Rather, given space 
constraints, our aim is more limited. Namely, we seek to gauge a selection of 
potential BHR treaty designs by reference to just one possible criterion of 
regulatory effectiveness: that any new BHR instrument should not embody or 
promote formalistic, perfunctory, superficial state compliance, or µregulatory 
ritualism’.  
Charlesworth and others have diagnosed problematic patterns in state 
compliance with obligations arising under human rights treaties and in the 
context of the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (µUPR’) 
                                                                                                                         
treaty>. For a regularly updated repository of BHR treaty debate materials, see Business and Human 
Rights Resource Centre, Binding Treaty: Statements, Initiatives & Commentaries <http://business-
humanrights.org/en/binding-treaty/statements-initiatives-commentaries>. One of us has elsewhere 
expressed scepticism over the need for a treaty process, especially so soon after the UNGPs’ unanimous 
adoption: Jolyon Ford, µBusiness and Human Rights: Bridging the Governance Gap’ (Research Paper, 
Chatham House: Royal Institute of International Affairs, September 2015). See also ICJ Report, above n 
5, 39. 
8  ICJ Report, above n 5, 8±9. 
9  Ibid 8, 41. 
10  Ibid 41. 
11  A discrete literature exists on human rights treaty effectiveness: see, eg, Linda Camp Keith, µThe United 
Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights 
Behaviour?’ (1999) 36 Journal of Peace Research 95 Douglass Cassel, µDoes International Human 
Rights Law Make a Difference?’ (2001) 2 Chicago Journal of International Law 121 Oona A Hathaway, 
µDo Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?’ (2002) 111 Yale Law Journal 1935 Eric Neumayer, 
µDo International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?’ (2005) 49 Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 925 Jack L Goldsmith and Eric A Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2005) Wade M Cole, µHuman Rights as Myth and Ceremony? Reevaluating the 
Effectiveness of Human Rights Treaties, 1981±2007’ (2012) 117 American Journal of Sociology 1131. 
See also Michael O’Flaherty and Claire Methven O’Brien, µReform of UN Human Rights Treaty 
Monitoring Bodies: A Critique of the Concept Paper on the High Commissioner’s Proposal for a Unified 
Standing Treaty Body’ (2007) 7 Human Rights Law Review 141. Aside from the human rights sphere, 
and beyond the scope of this article, there exists a wider literature on treaty effectiveness: see, eg, Efraim 
Chalamish, µDo Treaties Matter? On Effectiveness and International Economic Law’ (2011) 32 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 325. 
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which they denote by the term µritualism’. This concept was developed through a 
2010±15 research project led by Charlesworth at the Centre for International 
Governance and Justice at the Australian National University.12 This body of 
work has not yet addressed the BHR treaty question, however. Accordingly, our 
intended contribution in this article is to explore the potential of some possible 
BHR treaty designs to avoid the various weaknesses signalled by the µritualism’ 
hypothesis.13 Hence we select four possible BHR treaty variants and venture a 
preliminary assessment of the extent to which each may be exposed to the risk of 
ritualism: a broad-spectrum, single BHR treaty a narrow-spectrum BHR treaty 
on abuses amounting to international crimes a declaratory instrument and a 
µframework’ convention focused on promoting domestic implementation of the 
UNGPs including via the mechanism of BHR national action plans (µNAPs’).14 
Whereas one of us has elsewhere already expressed views in favour of the latter 
design for other reasons,15 based on the insights emerging from this exercise, we 
                                                 
12  For the research project homepage, see School of Regulation and Global Governance, Australian National 
University, Strengthening the International Human Rights System: Rights, Regulation and Ritualism (12 
February 2016) <http://regnet.anu.edu.au/research/research-projects/details/535/strengthening-
international-human-rights-system-rights>. See also Hilary Charlesworth, µSwimming to Cambodia: 
Justice and Ritual in Human Rights after Conflict’ (2010) 29 Australian Year Book of International Law 
1 Hilary Charlesworth and Emma Larking, µIntroduction: The Regulatory Power of the Universal 
Periodic Review’ in Hilary Charlesworth and Emma Larking (eds), Human Rights and the Universal 
Periodic Review: Rights and Ritualism (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 1 Benjamin Authers et al, 
µIntroduction: The Rituals of Human Rights’ (2018) forthcoming Humanity (copy on file with authors). 
The last source develops the same authors’ paper: Benjamin Authers et al, µThe Rituals of Human Rights’ 
(Paper presented at The Rituals of Human Rights Workshop, Centre for International Governance and 
Justice, Australian National University, 25±27 June 2014). The research project drew on various studies 
in domestic regulatory settings unrelated to human rights: see especially John Braithwaite, Toni Makkai 
and Valerie Braithwaite, Regulating Aged Care: Ritualism and the New Pyramid (Edward Elgar, 2007). 
13  We focus only on proposals for a treaty that would regulate state duties, putting aside those which 
envisage an instrument that would establish human rights duties on corporate actors under international 
law: see, eg, David Bilchit], µThe Necessity for a Business and Human Rights Treaty’ (2016) 1 Business 
and Human Rights Journal 203. 
14  See also Claire Methven O’Brien et al, µNational Action Plans on Business and Human Rights: A Toolkit 
for the Development, Implementation, and Review of State Commitments to Business and Human Rights 
Frameworks’ (Report, Danish Institute for Human Rights and International Corporate Accountability 
Roundtable, June 2014) Claire Methven O’Brien et al, µNational Action Plans: Current Status and Future 
Prospects for a New Business and Human Rights Governance Tool’ (2015) 1 Business and Human Rights 
Journal 117, 121 Damiano de Felice and Andreas Graf, µThe Potential of National Action Plans to 
Implement Human Rights Norms: An Early Assessment with respect to the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights’ (2015) 7 Journal of Human Rights Practice 40. See also United Nations 
Working Group on Business and Human Rights, State National Action Plans (2017) Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights <www.ohchr.org/EN/issues/Business/Pages/NationalAction 
Plans.aspx>. 
15  Claire Methven O’Brien, Submission to the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with respect to Human Rights, 30 September 
2016 <https://business-humanrights.org/en/for-a-business-and-human-rights-treaty-based-on-progressive-
national-implementation-of-the-ungps-and-modelled-after-the-who-framework-convention-on-tobacco-
control>. See also Letter from Claire Methven O’Brien, Danish Institute for Human Rights to the 
Members of the UN Working Group on Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises, 28 February 2011 <https://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/ 
Methven20OBrien20UNWG20sub280212-1.pdf>. The letter presents an outline for µa scheme for a 
global framework instrument on business and human rights’: at 1±2. See also Claire Methven O’Brien, 
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tentatively suggest that it also has the virtue of appearing more likely than the 
other models that we consider here to avoid or reduce mere ritualistic 
compliance.  
Finally, we engage in some further reflection on one important point of 
distinction between the ritualism critique and broader treaty effectiveness 
literature. As indeed recognised by Charlesworth and others, treaty-based 
participatory and performative rituals may, under certain conditions, potentially 
contribute to strengthening human rights commitments and building convergence 
on standards, rather than collapsing into ritualism. In Part IV, we try in a 
preliminary way to highlight some of the implications of this for a framework 
convention regime.  
Before proceeding, two caveats are needed. First, as stated, our focus here is 
on what particular form of BHR treaty would be most effective, understood in the 
restricted sense just described, rather than on the question of whether a treaty 
should be pursued at all. Nonetheless, it remains our view that the case for 
attempting to implement a BHR treaty, at this particular moment in time, still 
needs to be argued, rather than assumed, and evidence supplied to demonstrate 
how a treaty would µwork better’ than the UNGPs, or indeed other non-treaty 
approaches, in addressing current governance gaps.16 Moreover, the current BHR 
treaty process in the context of the OEIWG faces conceptual, legal doctrinal and 
diplomatic challenges, as would, in our view, any similar endeavour seeking to 
conclude a single comprehensive BHR instrument.17  
Secondly, despite the unanimous adoption of the UNGPs by the Human 
Rights Council in 2011, and their status as a µcommon reference point’ in BHR,18 
they are not without their critics amongst scholars, activists and governments. 
                                                                                                                         
µTransnational Business and Human Rights: The Case for a Multi-level Governance Approach’ (Position 
Paper, March 2007).  
16  Ford, µBridging the Governance Gap’, above n 7, 22±8 see also Jolyon Ford, µThe Risk of Regulatory 
Ritualism: Proposals for a Treaty on Business and Human Rights’ (Working Paper No 118, Global 
Economic Governance Programme, April 2016) 21±3. See also Interim Report, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/97, 
20 >81@. 
17  The OEIWG’s first session revealed the scale and complexity of the challenge of elaborating a single 
binding international instrument: Report on the First Session of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental 
Working Group on Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with respect to Human 
Rights, with the Mandate of Elaborating an International Legally Binding Instrument, UN Doc 
A/HRC/31/50 (5 February 2016) (µOEIWG First Session Report’). The report of the OEIWG’s second 
session shows that little progress has been made towards the development of specific legislative proposals 
in three years since the mandate’s establishment: Report on the Second Session of the Open-ended 
Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with 
respect to Human Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/34/47 (4 January 2017) (µOEIWG Second Session Report’). 
See also Carlos Lope] and Ben Shea, µNegotiating a Treaty on Business and Human Rights: A Review of 
the First Intergovernmental Session’ (2016) 1 Business and Human Rights Journal 111, 113±14 
Douglass Cassel, µTreaty Process Gets Underway: Whoever Said It Would Be Easy?’ on Business and 
Human Rights Resource Centre, Debate the Treaty (13 July 2015) <https://business-humanrights.org/en/ 
treaty-process-gets-underway-whoever-said-it-would-be-easy>. For objections to the single 
comprehensive BHR treaty model, see Ford, µThe Risk of Regulatory Ritualism’, above n 16, 21±4 
O’Brien, µSubmission to the OEIWG’, above n 15, 5±6. 
18  David Bilchit] and Surya Deva, µThe Human Rights Obligations of Business: A Critical Framework for 
the Future’ in David Bilchit] and Surya Deva (eds), Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the 
Corporate Responsibility to Respect? (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 1, 2. 
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Critics have, for instance, sought the articulation of standards establishing 
µdirect’ human rights obligations on businesses, specific extraterritorial 
obligations on states, and the creation by the Human Rights Council of dedicated 
adjudicatory or remedial mechanisms. Discussion of critiques of the UNGPs is 
beyond the scope of this article, but since we base our NAPs-related model on 
the UNGPs, it is worth noting that, in our view, many criticisms of the UNGPs as 
µsoft’ or µvoluntary’ misconceive the extent to which they reiterate clear existing 
duties on states to protect human rights from, and ensure access to remedy for, 
corporate and other sources of abuse.19 
 
II   RITUAL RITUALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS COM3LIANCE 
Charlesworth’s research project understood as µritual’ µceremonies or 
formalities that, through repetition, entrench the understandings and the  
power relationships that they embody’ and become µa means of enacting a  
social consensus’.20 The study highlights, amongst other things, the repetitive 
vocabulary used in human rights treaties and resolutions as well as routine yet 
carefully managed processes and performances in which states engage with 
respect to human rights reporting, reviews and recommendations.21 The project 
more broadly explores how, through its ritual-heavy institutions, symbols and 
discourses, law is authorised and reinforced: it is a µculturally constructed system 
of symbolic communication’22 involving µpublic, socially structuring events’ and 
modes of communication that follow µrecognisable and predictable patterns’.23 If 
human rights have become the doctrinal expression of µmodernity’s secular 
religion’,24 the contributors to the project argue, the textual articulation of its 
norms and their public performance via UN human rights forums are as 
ceremonial and reiterative as religious practices. 25  In examining how such 
processes have become central features of the international human rights system, 
the contributors identify how µemotionally potent rituals’ such as state human 
rights reporting and the generation of recommendations via the UPR process 
µmay generate politically engaged transformation’, noting in the case of the UPR 
an µunprecedented level of coordination and communication on human rights’.26  
                                                 
19  The premise that the UNGPs did not go µfar enough’ underlies the principal collection of critical essays: 
see Bilchit] and Deva, above n 18, 18±24. See also Chip Pitts, µThe United Nations ³Protect, Respect, 
Remedy´ Framework and Guiding Principles’ in Dorothpe Baumann-Pauly and Justine Nolan (eds), 
Business and Human Rights: From Principles to Practice (Routledge, 2016) 51. 
20  Charlesworth and Larking, µRegulatory Power’, above n 12, 8±9. 
21  Ibid 9. 
22  Authers et al, µIntroduction: The Rituals of Human Rights’, above n 12, 1±2.  
23  Authers et al, µPaper for The Rituals of Human Rights Workshop’, above n 12, 1. 
24  Ibid 3, citing Marie-Bpnpdicte Dembour, Who Believes in Human Rights? Reflections on the European 
Convention (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 2. 
25  Authers et al, µIntroduction: The Rituals of Human Rights’, above n 12, 3. 
26  Charlesworth and Larking, µRegulatory Power’, above n 12, 18. 
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While compliance rituals thus can have regulatory or transformative power, 
at least under certain conditions, 27  ritualism, in contrast, is diagnosed as 
problematic. For Charlesworth, µritualism’ is observed where a subject avoids 
substantive compliance with norms while at the same time superficially 
manifesting their acceptance via participation in associated institutions and 
procedures.28 Beyond the human rights sphere, such patterns have been shown to 
undermine even supposedly enlightened regulatory endeavours intended to 
embody empowerment and participatory strategies. 29  Inside the human rights 
system, Charlesworth and Larking observe, this tendency manifests in states’ 
satisfaction of formal reporting and review requirements, coupled with conduct 
that in fact tends to defeat real compliance with human rights’ substantive 
norms. 30  µRitualism’ is thus the µacceptance of institutionali]ed means for 
securing regulatory goals while losing all focus on achieving the goals or 
outcomes themselves’, 31  with the µlearned ignorance’ of shallow compliance-
verification behaviours as one of its symptoms.32  
Regulatory ritualism may hence emerge when excessive attention is paid, 
whether by states or other actors, to the formalities associated with acceptance of 
international human rights norms. Indeed, states have been observed to embrace 
human rights language and Geneva reporting procedures precisely to deflect 
more searching investigations into their substantive respect for the standards in 
question. 33  Ritualistic behaviour may then arise unwittingly or by calculated 
design. While complying with reporting and review procedures in multilateral 
forums, a state may in reality be incapable, indifferent or highly resistant to 
pursuing progress in realising the human rights in question.34 Such forums can 
thus permit states to mobilise human rights language in ways that serve to 
                                                 
27  See Part IV below. 
28  Charlesworth and Larking, µRegulatory Power’, above n 12, 10. 
29  Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite, above n 12, 258±9. Recently, beyond the BHR sphere, at least one 
UN human rights body has canvassed the risk of ritualistic compliance, while deliberating on the merits 
of pursuing the negotiation of an optional protocol. Noting Charlesworth’s critique, an Expert Group 
under the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues has suggested that state µcommitment’ to a new human 
rights instrument can help disguise a lack of commitment to human rights norms in far more subtle ways 
than outright rejection of them: Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs (UN), Concept Note: Expert Group Meeting: Dialogue on an Optional 
Protocol to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc PFII/2015/EGM (27±29 
January 2015) 10±11. 
30  Charlesworth and Larking, µRegulatory Power’, above n 12, 10 Authers et al, µPaper for The Rituals of 
Human Rights Workshop’, above n 12, 4. 
31  Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite, above n 12, 7, quoted in Charlesworth and Larking, µRegulatory 
Power’, above n 12, 10. 
32  Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite, above n 12, 219, quoting Michael Power, The Audit Society: 
Rituals of Verification (Oxford University Press, 1997) 123. 
33  Charlesworth, µSwimming to Cambodia’, above n 12, 12±13 see, eg, Bulto’s study of African states’ 
approach to Geneva processes: Takele Soboka Bulto, µAfrica’s Engagement with the Universal Periodic 
Review: Commitment or Capitulation’, in Hilary Charlesworth and Emma Larking (eds), Human Rights 
and the Universal Periodic Review: Rights and Ritualism (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 235. 
34  Charlesworth and Larking, µRegulatory Power’, above n 12, 10. 
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obstruct effective accountability for abuses, while allowing them to reap the 
associated reputational benefits and legitimacy.35 
In the UPR, for instance, µcooperation’, that is, regular participation in 
reporting processes and meetings, can readily coexist with a state’s reluctance to 
strengthen human rights protections.36 Kllin, one of the project’s contributors, 
suggests that the very universality of human rights norms and the UPR process in 
fact encourages ritualism by including states with poor records and low 
commitment.37 In relation to recommendations made by treaty bodies and other 
mechanisms, Oberleitner, another contributor to the research project, echoes 
Charlesworth in emphasising the need to avoid follow-up actions becoming 
repetitive, formalistic and µself-serving’ exercises that allow states to accept 
norms µperfunctor>ily@’. 38  Some contributors venture an even broader critique 
that:  
Through rituals based on a mixture of reiteration, symbolic language, and 
ceremonial performance, the idea that justice in the world can be achieved via 
human rights, and that these rights represent a politically neutral moral consensus, 
is established and entrenched.39  
Ritualism at this systemic level might conceivably over-promise 
transformation while masking the limited scope for the human rights paradigm, 
as currently institutionalised by states, to address structural inequalities and 
exclusions.40 
Besides Charlesworth’s project, of course, various scholars have addressed 
the topic of µtreaty effectiveness’. Earlier work in the sociology of law, for 
instance, explored treaties as µmyths’, in the sense that their efficacy and 
legitimacy was taken as given without specific empirical evidence of impact in 
achieving their regulatory objectives.41 Later, Hafner-Burton and others explored 
the extent to which state ratification of human rights instruments was 
                                                 
35  Ibid 18. Mares has noted that such initiatives can generate largely µsymbolic’ or ceremonial conformity 
without necessarily advancing substantive protections: Radu Mares, µBusiness and Human Rights after 
Ruggie: Foundations, the Art of Simplification and the Imperative of Cumulative Progress’ in Radu 
Mares (ed), The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Foundations and 
Implementation (Martinus Nijhoff, 2012) 1, 34. 
36  Charlesworth and Larking, µRegulatory Power’, above n 12, 16, 18. 
37  Walter Kllin, µRitual and Ritualism at the Universal Periodic Review: A Preliminary Appraisal’ in Hilary 
Charlesworth and Emma Larking (eds), Human Rights and the Universal Periodic Review: Rights and 
Ritualism (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 25, 31±41. 
38  Gerd Oberleitner, µCountering Ritualism: What Does It Mean to Follow-up Human Rights 
Recommendations?’ (Paper presented at The Rituals of Human Rights Workshop, Centre for 
International Governance and Justice, Australian National University, 25±27 June 2014) 1, 4 
<http://regnet.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/2015-08/1120Oberleitner2C 
20Countering20Ritualism.pdf>. 
39  Emma Larking, µHuman Rights Rituals: Masking Neoliberalism and Inequality, and Marginalising 
Alternative World Views?’ (2017) (unpublished, copy on file with authors) 3. 
40  See also Jane K Cowan, µThe Universal Periodic Review as a Public Audit Ritual’ in Hilary Charlesworth 
and Emma Larking (eds), Human Rights and the Universal Periodic Review: Rights and Ritualism 
(Cambridge University Press, 2014) 42, 61±2. 
41  John W Meyer and Brian Rowan, µInstitutionalised Organisations: Formal Structure as Myth and 
Ceremony’ (1977) 83 American Journal of Sociology 340. See also Cole, above n 11. 
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µceremonial’ in the sense of having little impact on wider state practice.42 Others 
have contended that formal participation in Geneva-based procedures and other 
forums can become µdecoupled’ from domestic measures to promote and protect 
human rights.43 Treaty-based processes, such analysts maintain, can on occasion 
be observed as diverting momentum from local efforts towards substantive 
change. Treaty procedures may hence allow states to clothe themselves in the 
mantle of µdoing something’ 44  while failing to progress needed reforms, 
institutionalisation and capacity strengthening on human rights at home. 
Accordingly, it has even been claimed that human rights treaties have the 
character of µempty promises’,45 in that they can provide a pretext for misplaced 
confidence that the treaty mechanism per se will resolve human rights breaches. 
Importantly, Charlesworth’s ritualism critique is distinct from this broader 
treaty effectiveness scholarship in various ways.46 For a start, it does not share the 
overt scepticism often found in that literature regarding states’ motives for 
entering and µcomplying’ with treaty regimes. Nor does it seek to question the 
assumption that the negotiation and adoption of instruments can improve the 
promotion of human rights (or at least not harm them) as that literature tends to.47 
Some scholars, for instance, claim to show that human rights treaty ratification 
fails to produce substantive effects, and may in fact worsen states’ human rights 
performance, with the role that ratification can play in offering states a form of 
legitimating cover advanced as one possible vector for this. 48  Hathaway, for 
instance, maintains that ratification and participation may or may not be sincere, 
and yet be counted as demonstrating state engagement or even compliance in 
both cases.49 This, she argues, is harmful because the pressure a state might 
otherwise be under to comply is weakened by recognition of its record of 
participation in the procedures of an international regime. Such contentions in 
some ways resonate with the thrust of Charlesworth’s critique. Nevertheless, 
Charlesworth does not go so far as to advance claims concerning the net impact 
                                                 
42  Emilie M Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, µHuman Rights in a Globalising World: The Paradox of 
Empty Promises’ (2005) 110 American Journal of Sociology 1373 Emilie M Hafner-Burton and 
Kiyoteru Tsutsui, µJustice Lost The Failure of International Human Rights Law to Matter Where Needed 
Most’ (2007) 44 Journal of Peace Research 407 Emilie M Hafner-Burton, Kiyoteru Tsutsui and John W 
Meyer, µInternational Human Rights Law and the Politics of Legitimation: Repressive States and Human 
Rights Treaties’ (2008) 23 International Sociology 115. 
43  Dima Jamali, µMNCs and International Accountability Standards through an Institutional Lens: Evidence 
of Symbolic Conformity or Decoupling’ (2010) 95 Journal of Business Ethics 617 see generally Hafner-
Burton and Tsutsui, µHuman Rights in a Globalising World’, above n 42. 
44  Tony Evans and Jan Hancock, µDoing Something without Doing Anything: International Law and the 
Challenge of Globalisation’ (1998) 2(3) International Journal of Human Rights 1. 
45  This is a principal theme of Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, µHuman Rights in a Globalising World’, above n 
42. 
46  See the references at above n 12. 
47  See especially Hathaway, µDo Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?’, above n 11 see also Oona A 
Hathaway, µWhy Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?’ (2007) 51 Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 588. 
48  Other research has noted the highly contingent nature of positive treaty effects depending on the pre-
existing quality of democracy and rule of law in ratifying states: see, eg, Neumayer, above n 11, 925±6 
see also Cole, above n 11, 1132. 
49  Hathaway, µDo Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?’, above n 11, 1941. 
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of treaties on the enjoyment of human rights at ground level, or to identify 
variables with predictive or explanatory power as regard treaties’ compliance 
effects.50 
  
III   TREATY MODELS: GAUGING THE RIS. OF RITUALISM 
Since the launch of the OEIWG in 2014, various BHR treaty models  
have been outlined, 51  some by academics in the field, 52  others by interested 
organisations.53 Amongst these have been suggestions for: 
x a comprehensive single BHR treaty addressing state obligations with 
regard to business-related abuses of all human rights, by all kinds of 
business enterprises  
x a µdeclaratory instrument’ that would reiterate or µclarify’ the scope of 
the state duty to protect and remedy human rights in respect of business-
related abuses.54 One version of this variant would also articulate a home 
state duty to protect against the human rights impacts of transnational 
corporations operating abroad55 
x a µframework convention’56 that might, for example, oblige states parties 
to adopt and implement an NAP 
                                                 
50  Cf Neumayer, above n 11. 
51  The OEIWG itself has not yet indicated a preference for any particular model, although its driving 
members appear to envisage a single comprehensive instrument intended as µcomplementary’ to the 
UNGPs: OEIWG First Session Report, UN Doc A/HRC/31/50, 6 >23@, 8 >29@, 9 >39@. See also Douglass 
Cassel and Anita Ramasastry, µWhite Paper: Options for a Treaty on Business and Human Rights’ (2016) 
6(1) Notre Dame Journal of International and Comparative Law 1, 15. For a useful overview of the BHR 
treaty debate, see Justine Nolan, µA Business and Human Rights Treaty’ in Dorothpe Baumann-Pauly and 
Justine Nolan (eds), Business and Human Rights: From Principles to Practice (Routledge, 2016) 70, 70±
3. 
52  As noted at above n 13, we do not consider further here proposals for an instrument purporting directly to 
regulate corporate actors in human rights law as we see these ideas as unlikely to materialise, including 
for legal doctrinal reasons. Olivier De Schutter has canvassed the creation of an instrument establishing 
direct human rights obligations on corporations but only in relation to µserious’ violations: Olivier De 
Schutter, µTowards a New Treaty on Business and Human Rights’ (2016) 1 Business and Human Rights 
Journal 41, 58±62. For discussion of problems associated with µdirect’ corporate obligations, see Claire 
Methven O’Brien, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations: For a Multi-level Governance 
Approach (PhD Thesis, European University Institute, 2009) ch 2. 
53  See especially ICJ Report, above n 5, 34±45, 47±9. See also Cassel and Ramasastry’s µillustrative 
options’ for a treaty: Cassel and Ramasastry, above n 51, 17±30. A civil society µTreaty Initiative’ has 
convened an expert group to develop proposals on treaty design options: International Federation for 
Human Rights, µFIDH and ESCR-Net New Joint ³Treaty Initiative´’ (Press Release, 30 January 2015) 
<https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/globalisation-human-rights/business-and-human-rights/16868-fidh-and-
escr-net-new-joint-treaty-initiative>. See also one panellist’s suggested options as recorded in the OEIWG 
Second Session Report, UN Doc A/HRC/34/47, 17 >98@. 
54  ICJ Report, above n 5, 9, 43±4 Cassel and Ramasastry, above n 51, 29±30. 
55  De Schutter, above n 52, 45±7. 
56  Ibid 55±7 ICJ Report, above n 5. According to Cassel and Ramasastry, this would be one type of 
µnational action’ treaty: Cassel and Ramasastry, above n 51, 19, 24. The µframework convention’ model 
was also advanced by one panellist at the last OEIWG meeting: OEIWG Second Session Report, UN Doc 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3206479 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3206479 
2017 Thematic: Empty Rituals or Workable Models? 1233
x a µsubsidiary’ instrument on mutual legal assistance and legal 
cooperation between states in providing effective remedies to claimants57 
x optional protocols to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights58 
x a µdomestic criminalisation’ instrument modelled on the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption or the Convention on the Protection of 
the Environment through Criminal Law59 
x an µinternational criminalisation’ option comprising a treaty addressing 
corporate involvement in abuses that may also constitute offences under 
international criminal law, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and slavery or forced labour60  
x a µnational action’ treaty obliging states to require a defined category of 
corporations to report on measure they have taken to implement human 
rights due diligence61 
x an µaccess to remedy’ convention obliging states to facilitate access to 
civil remedies in national courts via transnational torts and other claims 
for victims of business-related human rights abuses62 
x an µinternational enforcement machinery’ treaty.63 In their scheme, for 
instance, Cassel and Ramasastry refer to models that would establish for 
BHR familiar human rights treaty processes that require progress reports 
on implementation, shadow reporting, and the review of state reports by 
an expert committee followed by the issuing of recommendations or 
observations, as well as individual or collective complaints 
mechanisms64 
x a µcomprehensive’ model combining some or all of the elements of the 
µnational action’ and µinternational machinery’ models65 
                                                                                                                         
A/HRC/34/47, 11 >56@, 12 >65@, 17 >98@. The NAP incorporation model is one advanced by O’Brien, 
µSubmission to the OEIWG’, above n 15, 1±3. 
57  De Schutter, above n 52, 63±6. 
58  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1966, 999 
UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976) see 
ICJ Report, above n 5, 41. 
59  United Nations Convention against CorruptionÜ opened for signature 9 December 2003, 2349 UNTS 41 
(entered into force 14 December 2005) Convention on the Protection of the Environment through 
Criminal Law, opened for signature 4 November 1998, ETS No 172 (not yet in force) see ICJ Report, 
above n 5, 40. Such an approach is also canvassed in Cassel and Ramasastry above n 51, 25±7. 
60  Cassel and Ramasastry, above n 51, 25±7, 35±7. 
61  Ibid 19±20. 
62  Ibid 28±9 ICJ Report, above n 5, 36. 
63  Cassel and Ramasastry above n 51, 30±8. 
64  Cassel and Ramasastry include within this category the possibility of some new forum, or fora, for 
international civil adjudication or arbitration of claims for remedies based on business-related rights 
abuses, even if they appear sceptical about the prospects of new institutional mechanisms of this sort: ibid 
32±5. 
65  Ibid 37. 
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x a µpolicy coherence’ treaty that would involve states committing to 
review and amend national laws and international agreements to ensure 
that these are consistent with the existing state duty to protect human 
rights from business-related abuses66 
x µsectoral’ or µviolation-specific’ treaties an example of the latter being 
an instrument on human trafficking as it relates to corporate supply 
chains.67 
In what follows we do not systematically assess each of these proposals by 
reference to the risk of their succumbing to µritualism’. This is not simply for 
reasons of economy. Other factors also militate against a full exposition of all 
proposals in this article. Few of the above proposals have been fleshed out in 
detail. In addition, variation across proposals in terms of what they say about the 
scope and content of the legal obligations they advocate, as well as in terms of 
their intended structure, yields a highly heterogeneous set of design options.68 
Thus, for some proponents, the priority is criminalisation of corporate abuses 
whereas for others, the aim should be convergence amongst protection and 
remedial standards enacted at the national level. Meanwhile, some proposals do 
not aim at the establishment of a new BHR instrument as such but rather the 
incorporation of specific BHR components into existing legal frameworks and 
institutions.69 Others again advance specific clauses that might sit within a future 
BHR treaty framework, without defining or elaborating that framework. For 
instance, some contributions are ostensibly BHR treaty design inputs but in fact 
address only isolated issues, such as the interface between states’ obligations 
arising respectively under human rights treaties and trade and investment 
agreements. 70  Moreover, such schema as do now exist present overlapping 
µtypes’ of treaties, of varying µstrengths’. Thus, Cassel and Ramasastry’s 2015 
mapping of µillustrative options’ describes a spectrum from a relatively 
undemanding regime requiring states to mandate public reporting by large 
companies, to a µstrong’ treaty establishing civil and criminal remedies for 
business-related abuses in national and international judicial forums, or even a 
special court for such purposes.71 
For present purposes, such a lack of uniformity amongst treaty proposals, in 
terms of key parameters, rules out comprehensive or coherent comparison 
between them. Notwithstanding, we suggest that it is still possible to advance 
some preliminary observations on the risk of ritualism attaching to some treaty 
                                                 
66  Ibid 38±9. 
67  Ibid 39. 
68  Thus, an option to narrow a treaty’s scope by dealing only with µgross’ violations does not necessarily 
point to one or other structure or model of treaty. On the significant uncertainties and complexities of 
treaty scope in this area, see ibid 39±49. 
69  Eg, expanding the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction: see ICJ Report, above n 5, 39±40. 
70  See, eg, Markus Krajewski, µEnsuring the Primacy of Human Rights in Trade and Investment Policies: 
Model Clauses for a Treaty on Transnational Corporations, Other Businesses, and Human Rights’ (Study, 
CIDSE, March 2017) cf Lorand Bartels, µA Model Human Rights Clause for the EU’s International 
Trade Agreements’ (Study, German Institute for Human Rights, February 2014).  
71  Cassel and Ramasastry, above n 51, 17 ff. 
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models. To narrow the scope of our analysis further, we deliberately set aside 
some of the above proposals from consideration, because they arguably face 
greater difficulties than those associated with ritualism. For example, De 
Schutter’s proposal for an instrument affirming states’ µextraterritorial 
obligations’ assumes that states have legal duties in respect of business abuses 
abroad, for which there is little evidence.72 Likewise, a treaty focused on creating 
µdirect’ human rights obligations of businesses under international law73 would 
face profound problems of doctrinal coherence. 
At the same time, it is worth noting that our analysis is partial in the sense 
that it has little to engage with because many proposals so far have not been 
advanced with reference to any explicit argument about their likely regulatory 
effectiveness, in their own terms or by comparison with alternative approaches. 
In our introduction, for example, we noted that the ICJ Report explicitly opts to 
µ>set@ aside’ issues such as µdeficiencies in the practical application of 
standards’. 74  Rather, and without reference to empirical or other studies 
addressing human rights treaty effectiveness, it simply asserts that a new BHR 
instrument could address well-known state compliance problems by µcreating or 
reinforcing duties and mechanisms to facilitate domestic implementation’. 75 
Further, it claims that µimplementation gaps such as those in monitoring, 
supervision or adjudication are problems that international instruments usually 
help to solve’, which begs the question whether such instruments are in fact 
implemented and given domestic effect.76 The ICJ Report, we suggest, is thus 
symptomatic of many pro-treaty contributions, in its lack of concern for 
regulatory effectiveness, failure to substantiate claims about compliance effects 
in the broader treaty effectiveness scholarship and reliance on somewhat circular 
reasoning.  
Moreover, there would seem to be a greater risk of ritualism in cases where 
from the outset it is assumed that creation of an instrument will, of itself, resolve 
implementation gaps. Thus, it might even be that the strongest critique emerging 
from a ritualist perspective relates not to the susceptibility to ritualism of any 
particular treaty design, but to the participation, by treaty proponents themselves, 
in a ritual: namely that of automatically resorting to a treaty µfix’, without critical 
                                                 
72  Ford, µBridging the Governance Gap’, above n 7, 18±20. For critique of proposed treaty clauses relating 
to extraterritorial state obligations to regulate transnational firms operating abroad, see Claire Methven 
O’Brien, µThe Home State Duty to Regulate the Human Rights Impacts of TNCs Abroad: A Case of 
Extraterritorial Overreach?’ (Matters of Concern Series: Human Rights Research Paper No 2016/04, 
Danish Institute for Human Rights, 18 October 2016). See also John Ruggie, Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises: Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of 
Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, UN Doc A/HRC/4/35 (19 February 2007) 6±7 
>15@ Protect, Respect, Remedy Report, UN Doc A/HRC/8/5, 7 >19@. While these reports are now a decade 
old, there is scant evidence that state practice or opinio juris has materially shifted in the interim. 
73  See, eg, Bilchit], above n 13, 207±10. 
74  ICJ Report, above n 5, 8. 
75  Ibid 43. As discussed above, it further notes that a new instrument has µclear potential’ to be effective, 
without explaining what will ensure or define this effectiveness: at 41. 
76  Ibid 8 (emphasis added). 
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reflection beforehand on whether such a solution is optimal, or even apposite, as 
a regulatory remedy for the underlying problems at hand.77  
Returning to current treaty proposals, how do these fare when viewed 
through the lens of ritualism? Do some treaty models present a material risk of 
µperfunctory’ engagement 78  by states, while also displacing opportunities for 
more effective rights protection and remediation activities? Again, we 
acknowledge that there may be too little detail available as yet to support a 
categorical finding that ritualism would inevitably undermine one or more of 
those BHR treaty regimes listed above. Yet we do suggest that the risk of 
regulatory ritualism is unlikely to be uniform across different models, and can be 
expected to vary according to their specific characteristics and respective patterns 
of state participation.  
For all the foregoing reasons, we restrict our preliminary analysis to the 
following four treaty proposal types. 
 
A   BroadSpectrum Single BHR Treaty 
To date, the OEIWG has not itself proposed a particular treaty model,79 but at 
least some of its members appear to envisage a comprehensive single instrument. 
Ruggie’s various objections in relation to µwhether to treaty’80 were probably 
strongest in relation to this kind of single overarching instrument,81 including on 
grounds of opportunity cost that is, the risk that states would invoke a treaty 
negotiation process as a pretext for prolonged inaction in relation to existing 
obligations and the UNGPs, and the reform momentum that a treaty process 
would thus absorb.  
To such misgivings, we suggest, can be added the risk of ritualism. Based on 
state responses to the 2003 UN draft Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to 
                                                 
77  Arguments in relation to extraterritorial state duties have also perhaps taken on a form of ritualism of 
their own, with some experts repeatedly asserting the existence of state duties as if repetition alone, 
without evidence of state practice, is capable of establishing such duties. De Schutter exhibits such 
circularity when, in arguing for the existence of a customary international law duty on states to regulate 
human rights and business extraterritorially, he cites as important evidence the µMaastricht Principles’, 
adopted by a group of academics of which he was himself a member: De Schutter, above n 52, 55, citing 
ETO Consortium, µMaastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (28 September 2011). 
78  Oberleitner, above n 38, 1. 
79  Its reports chronicle participant and panellist observations in response to a call to identify issues a treaty 
could address. With few exceptions (see, eg, the panellist recorded in the OEIWG Second Session Report, 
UN Doc A/HRC/34/47, 17 >98@), participants have offered only vague suggestions as to specific models 
and structure: for example, that any treaty should provide for µindividual liability’ of corporate officers, or 
µan international court to enforce the treaty’: OEIWG Second Session Report, UN Doc A/HRC/34/47, 7 
>23@, 9 >40@. 
80  See, eg, Protect, Respect, Remedy Report, UN Doc A/HRC/8/5 cf John Ruggie, µClosing Plenary 
Remarks’ (Speech delivered at the Third United Nations Forum on Business and Human Rights, Geneva, 
3 December 2014) 6 <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/ForumSession3/Submissions/ 
JohnRuggieBSRBSGBBHR.pdf>. 
81  See Mares, above n 35, 9.  
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Human Rights,82 states’ submissions during the drafting of the UNGPs, and now 
in the context of the OEIWG, it seems likely that such an instrument would fail 
to attract widespread participation and ratification, particularly amongst larger 
economies. Accordingly, a broad-spectrum treaty addressing all human rights, all 
business enterprises and seeking to establish business obligations to uphold 
human rights on the same footing as those of states might be highly susceptible to 
empty, formalistic state compliance, yet at the same time providing a pretext for 
the position that the issue is now being internationally µregulated’ so that no more 
need be done. At the very least, an OEIWG-led process that did not consider how 
a treaty mechanism would assimilate or connect with existing UN forums might 
be viewed as a token, ritualistic or symbolic new gesture.83 If the most significant 
governance gap in relation to BHR is the failure to honour and enforce existing 
laws,84 proponents of new regimes surely need to explain by what mechanisms 
these will promote compliance, rather than merely recapitulating a list of 
obligations that will remain unmet.85  
 
B   NarroZSpectrum BHR Treaty on Abuses Amounting to International 
Crimes 
By contrast, proposals for a narrow-spectrum treaty addressing only those 
business-related human rights rising to the level of international crimes may be 
plausible in terms of legal principle. Yet they similarly lack practical and 
political viability. Excluding a broad swathe of serious business-related rights 
abuses, particularly of a socioeconomic nature, they appear unlikely to satisfy a 
treaty’s non-state advocates. Hence, like the option of a general-scope treaty, a 
narrow scope instrument also appears vulnerable to empty, formalistic state 
compliance, though for different reasons: a lack of civil society engagement 
would weaken accountability with review procedures consequently reduced to 
states’ self-policing.  
 
                                                 
82  Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, UN ESCOR, 
55th sess, 22nd mtg, Agenda Item 4, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (26 August 2004, adopted 13 
August 2003) cf Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Related Business Enterprises with 
Regard to Human Rights, Commission on Human Rights Dec 2004/116, 60th sess, 56th mtg (20 April 
2004) in Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Sixtieth Session, UN ESCOR, 60th sess, Supp No 
3, UN Doc E/2004/23 (2004) ch II(B) 332±3. 
83  This may be one of the intentions behind the European Union’s observations in the OEIWG Second 
Session Report, UN Doc A/HRC/34/47, 4 >14@. One panellist is recorded as noting that any binding 
instrument should be developed in a way that recognises and addresses the reasons why existing 
mechanisms suffer from compliance and enforcement gaps: at 9 >38@. 
84  John Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the Issue of Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: Business and Human Rights: Further 
Steps Towards the Operationalisation of the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, UN Doc 
A/HRC/14/27 (9 April 2010) 5 >18@. 
85  It is worth noting that the ICJ Report does not fully explain its support for µdecoupling’ a treaty process 
from the UNGPs: ICJ Report, above n 5, 45. 
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C   Declaratory Instrument 
Various proposals have focused on a µdeclaratory’ instrument which would 
µusefully list’,86 µmake explicit’87 or clarify states’ existing duties88 (for example, 
to provide effective remedies). This treaty type might conceivably secure a 
measure of consensus and renew, at least temporarily, the UNGPs’ momentum 
while strengthening their normative basis, and so be thought likely to promote 
further convergence in state and business practice. Yet at the same time these 
models arguably raise the spectre of repetitive recitation, a form or symptom of 
ritualism, while clear articulation of how their merits would offset their risks 
remains lacking. In discussing this model, De Schutter, for instance, does not 
explain what the added regulatory value of a declaratory instrument simply 
listing states’ existing duties might be. Should a declaration have merit in 
regulatory terms, this in any case needs to be weighed against the µdownsides’ 
highlighted by the ritualism critique, and in particular the effect that repetitive 
gestures can have in obscuring state inaction on substantive matters. 
State duties relating to BHR have been affirmed by the relatively recent and 
unanimous Human Rights Council resolutions on the UN µProtect, Respect, 
Remedy’ Framework and UNGPs respectively adopted in 2008 and 2011. 89 
Unless in the guise of a µdeclaration’ what is proposed is in fact a treaty 
establishing more onerous duties than now exist,90 states gathering to µagree’ a 
merely declaratory instrument might be characterised, from the perspective of 
Charlesworth’s critique, as engaged in a ritualistic recitation of existing 
obligations. Would such a process and product merely add more µnoise’ to the 
existing µcascade of words’ in the global human rights system?91 If not, through 
what mechanisms would such a performance enervate national-level 
implementation? Arguably, proponents of a declaratory regime ought to at least 
take the ritualism risk seriously enough to explain why it is negligible, or worth 
taking for other reasons. 
 
D   FrameZorN Convention  
The main elements of a framework treaty built around NAPs and the UNGPs, 
we suggest, would include broad commitments by states with reference to the 
UNGPs to adopt appropriate national measures to implement relevant 
international norms, in this case, the 2008 UN µProtect, Respect, Remedy’ 
Framework, and to promote their effective implementation. It would also include 
                                                 
86  De Schutter, above n 52, 64. De Schutter talks of simply listing state obligations under a proposed 
µsubsidiary’ model: at 64 and discusses a declaratory instrument on extraterritorial obligations: at 46. 
87  Cassel and Ramasastry, above n 51, 29. 
88  ICJ Report, above n 5, 9, 43±4. 
89  Protect, Respect, Remedy Framework Resolution, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/8/7 Guiding Principles 
Resolution, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/17/4. 
90  In particular, as noted above, on the question of extraterritorial obligations, De Schutter appears to 
concede an instrument prescribing such a duty would be µhighly controversial’, suggesting the duty is in 
fact not already established in international law and ready to be µdeclared’ in a treaty: De Schutter, above 
n 52, 66. 
91  Ford, µThe Risk of Regulatory Ritualism’, above n 16, 17. 
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undertakings to consider in future the adoption of additional measures on specific 
issues (such as supply chain due diligence or access to judicial remedies) via 
protocols or other procedures. Finally, it would embody a specific commitment 
to develop an NAP, through an appropriate multi-stakeholder, participatory 
national process, and periodically to present it and participate in peer dialogue or 
review at the international or regional levels.92 
If it is true that scholars have not yet engaged in in-depth theorisation or 
empirically-informed evaluation of the relative or absolute effectiveness of this 
type of regime, at first glance such a BHR µframework convention’ might also 
seem susceptible to ritualism. For example, it is not self-evident that any 
instrument according to which states would agree to undertake NAP processes or 
submit NAPs for peer review would necessarily increase µaccountability « 
policy coherence « accelerate>d@ collective learning « and gradual 
convergence’. 93  De Schutter accepts that for this to happen would require a 
µrobust follow-up mechanism at international level’, but does not outline how a 
convention might create such a mechanism.94 Cassel and Ramasastry similarly 
note the option of a µframework’ treaty that could be inclusive and not too 
demanding but which might µset in motion an ongoing process of review and 
elaboration of additional standards over time’.95 Yet they acknowledge as equally 
likely that it might fail to generate gradual improvements and displace 
momentum for action.96 Others have observed that the promise of state activity 
on NAPs under the UNGPs may need to be weighed against the risk that the 
process (alternatively, ceremony or ritual) of NAP production might act as a µfig 
leaf’ for substantive inaction.97  
Nevertheless, the risk of ritualism emerging under a framework convention 
might be worth taking given reasons to think this risk is limited and that such a 
convention would, despite it, promote substantive µcumulative progress’.98 Here 
we identify five.  
First, there are various precedents for this model beyond the BHR area 
including the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control which, with 168 
signatories, is one of the most subscribed-to treaties in the UN system.99 This 
suggests that the framework convention approach is at least in principle 
amenable to wide state participation.  
Second is the existence of a strong mandate for UNGPs-focused NAPs. The 
Council has called on UN member states to produce NAPs, 100  as have the 
                                                 
92  Here we build on O’Brien, µSubmission to the OEIWG’, above n 15, 4. 
93  De Schutter, above n 52, 56±7. 
94  Ibid. 
95  Cassel and Ramasastry, above n 51, 24. They also note that a framework convention would not satisfy 
those who think that an instrument should provide for remedial options for particular allegations of 
violation: at 25. 
96  Ibid 25. 
97  O’Brien et al, µCurrent Status and Future Prospects’, above n 14, 121. 
98  Mares, above n 35. 
99  Opened for signature 16 June 2003, 2302 UNTS 166 (entered into force 27 February 2005). See also 
WHO, WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (2017) <http://www.who.int/fctc/en/>.  
100  Human Rights and Transnational Corporations Resolution, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/26/22, para 2. 
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European Union101 and Council of Europe102 with respect to their members.103 
NAPs-related processes are underway in approximately 40 countries worldwide, 
a level of implementation effort that is not insignificant given the short time that 
has elapsed since 2011.104 Numerous states participating in the OEIWG in 2016 
alluded to their engagement in NAP processes. This indicates a healthy measure 
of political support for NAPs and, given that governments are under no formal 
obligation to deliver them, suggests that they are seen by governments as having 
sufficient value to justify the time and resources being deployed. While this does 
not necessarily obviate the risk of ritualism, it does suggest at least the possibility 
of a more engaged approach than ritualistic compliance would entail.  
A third factor is the primacy of the national level in defining BHR 
regulations that a framework convention should afford. If BHR norms are to be 
truly effective, they need to penetrate every area of national policy, from food to 
finance, corporate governance to court procedure. This means that scope to 
consider, and respond to, the peculiarities of each country’s national context in 
the course of devising implementation measures is essential. In addition, the 
more detailed the prescriptions a conventional treaty might make, for instance, 
regarding the class of companies obliged to perform human rights due diligence, 
the less likely it will be that such rules can or will be universally implemented 
the more general a treaty’s prescriptions, the more it would duplicate what the 
UNGPs framework already reaffirms, so raising the spectre of rhetorical ritual. 
Detailed BHR rule-making, to have traction, relevance and a chance of practical 
application, should hence occur at national level, but within a global framework 
and situated within a shared discourse. Combined with mechanisms for reporting 
on and reviewing them at a global or regional level, NAPs should thus provide an 
impetus for making such rules as well as for reviewing their effectiveness, 
together with relevant non-governmental organisations and other constituencies, 
on an ongoing basis.  
This links to a fourth reason to favour an NAPs-based model, which relates to 
meaningful and inclusive engagement of various state and, crucially, non-state 
constituencies (eg, non-governmental organisations), especially at the national 
                                                 
101  European Commission, µCommunication from the European Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ± A Renewed 
EU Strategy 2011±14 for Corporate Social Responsibility’ (COM (2011) No 681 final, 25 October 2011). 
102  Committee of Ministers, Council of Europe µRecommendation CM/Rec (2016)3 of the Committee of 
Ministers to Member States on Human Rights and Business’ (2 March 2016). 
103  The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (µOECD’) has also hosted discussions of 
NAPs in the context of its annual Global Forum on Responsible Business Conduct in 2015 and 2016: see 
Angel Gurrta, Secretary General of the OECD, µOpening Remarks’ (Speech delivered at the Third Global 
Forum on Responsible Business Conduct, Paris, 18 June 2015). Likewise, NAP discussions have been 
integrated into meetings of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean: see, eg, 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, µAgenda for Regional Consultation’ 
(Prepared for the Regional Consultation for Latin America and the Caribbean on Public Policy for the 
Implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in the Framework of the 
2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development, Santiago, 2±3 March 2016).  
104  On the other hand, so far only seven NAPs have finally been adopted worldwide: Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, State National Action Plans <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/ 
Business/Pages/NationalActionPlans.aspx>. 
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level. Without active local engagement from both rights-holders and duty-
bearers, the advancement of human rights proceeds falteringly, if at all. While the 
message from the very top is important, ultimately human rights must be 
absorbed into the organisational values of public and private institutions at macro 
and micro levels and assimilated into their rules and codes. Though universal 
guarantees are essential, only from direct encounters can increased mutual 
understanding, trust, and collaborative problem-solving emerge. Inclusive, 
participatory, deliberative and iterative NAP processes should create multiple 
opportunities to strengthen the knowledge and capacities of national and local 
actors on BHR to bring key stakeholders together to engender new networks 
and partnerships and, where affected communities and individuals are 
adequately involved, to let those on the hard end of globalisation claim their 
rights and speak truth to power.105 By contrast, and though the picture is in some 
respects improving, centralised, Geneva-based human rights treaty processes too 
often give precedence to ritualistic form over substance, remaining remote and 
inaccessible to the rights-holders and indeed the duty-bearers who should be their 
principal concern.106 
Fifth, such a framework convention might act as a platform for building 
consensus, policy learning and cross-fertilisation.107 Because of the novelty and 
complexity of the BHR agenda, knowledge on µwhat works’ in terms of 
regulatory techniques and legislative models is still sparse. Countries are in the 
course of experimentation (for example, in the areas of supply chain 
responsibility and transparency) but a firm evidence-base and agreed criteria on 
which to judge the relative strengths and weaknesses of different approaches, 
much less the µsuccesses’ and µfailures’, is still lacking. National experiences 
captured in NAPs and ongoing global or regional review and dialogue based on 
NAPs, would provide invaluable raw data. Rather than imposing a single model 
of regulation across the board, as single comprehensive or narrow-spectrum 
instruments might, such an approach would allow policy innovation to flourish 
continuously, and dynamically, in response to new issues, risks and technologies, 
as they develop. At the same time, NAPs and a structured review process are apt 
to render countries’ various efforts much more visible to a global audience, 
potentially promoting and accelerating convergence around those models and 
interventions that seem capable of delivering the best results. That is, a 
framework convention that promoted rituals of reporting on NAPs processes and 
implementation might nevertheless have value if it generated, over time, a body 
of learning and community of encouragement on national-level protection, 
promotion and remediation measures. 
                                                 
105  See O’Brien et al, µNational Action Plans: A Toolkit’, above n 14, ch 6, for illustrative guidance on how, 
in practical terms, inclusive, participatory NAP processes might be secured.  
106  For such criticisms in relation to UN treaty monitoring bodies, see literature reviewed by O’Flaherty and 
O’Brien, above n 11.  
107  These arguments are also advanced by De Schutter, above n 52, 57, and Cassel and Ramasastry, above n 
51, 24±5. For an overview of literature suggesting why a framework convention rather than a traditional 
µcommand and control’ treaty model would be likely to deliver such outcomes, drawn from social theory, 
public administration, regulation theory and international relations, see O’Brien, Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations, above n 52, ch 6 (µMulti-level Governance’). 
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IV   RITUALISM IN THE CONTE;T OF A FRAMEWOR. 
CONVENTION: FURTHER REFLECTIONS 
Some of these arguments in favour of a framework convention find 
resonance in regulatory theory ± and in the ritualism critique in particular. As 
noted above, Charlesworth’s project observed a tension and overlap between 
rituals and ritualism,108 and proceeded on the basis that ritualism, rather than 
rituals per se, may be problematic in the international human rights system.109 To 
recall, rituals and symbolic performances may transmit social meanings and 
express community aspirations as well as embody power relations in fundamental 
ways, and so have certain regulatory or transformative power, or significance for 
building community consensus or social cohesion. 110  Rituals can thus be 
important means for µreaffirming and legitimising’ some core values,111 and can 
be µmarkers of success’ suggesting a way of thinking has achieved some 
permanence and importance.112 While the rituals of human rights reporting and 
review have deep political implications and are riven with complex power 
relations, Charlesworth’s project concluded that these rituals might be neither 
inherently transformative nor inevitably conservative.113 Likewise, human rights 
review processes and recommendations are not necessarily meaningless or empty 
but rather embody a form of obligation or at least expectation that has potential 
regulatory significance. 114  Charlesworth and Larking identified the scope for 
seeing rituals of human rights reporting in Geneva as capable of generating 
µpolitically engaged transformation’ and greater state coordination and 
communication on human rights, such that these rituals may be µa step on  
a journey’ towards substantive state human rights compliance. 115  Given state 
sensitivities, rituals that engage states’ participation in the rhetoric of obligation 
may have considerable regulatory value and empowering potential, or at least 
some redeeming features. That is, there may be value in the consequences of 
human rights treaties and their ratification, such as their signalling, reinforcing 
effect, their effect in framing politics in a shared normative vocabulary through 
which non-state actors can engage the state. 116  To the extent that reducing 
contestation is beneficial, UN rituals at Geneva, by their inclusive nature, can 
                                                 
108  Charlesworth and Larking, µRegulatory Power’, above n 12, 18. 
109  Authers et al, µPaper for The Rituals of Human Rights Workshop’, above n 12, 4±5. 
110  Ibid 1. 
111  Kllin, above n 37, 33. 
112  Charlesworth and Larking, µRegulatory Power’, above n 12, 9. 
113  Authers et al, µPaper for The Rituals of Human Rights Workshop’, above n 12, 6. The contributors see 
their project as µopen’ concerning whether or not, ultimately, rituals advance human rights principles, 
while arguing that if they result in ritualism, that is problematic: at 6. 
114  Oberleitner, above n 38, 4. For how UPR rituals can help resistant states to engage on human rights in a 
less confronting way, allowing for norms to infiltrate their practices, see, eg, Cowan, above n 40, 51±2 
Bulto, above n 33, 253±4.  
115  Charlesworth and Larking, µRegulatory Power’, above n 12, 18. The authors elsewhere describe the ritual 
strengths of the UPR as µrallying participants around a common cause and reaffirming common rules and 
values’: at 11, citing Kllin, above n 37. 
116  See also Cassel, µDoes International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?’, above n 11, 130. 
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reduce such contestation, promoting state engagement.117 Simply by engaging in 
treaty and other reporting processes in the language of human rights, it might be 
said, even a recalcitrant state implicitly asserts the validity and relevance of 
human rights guarantees, contributing to at least some consensus, even a weak 
one.118 Cowan thus qualifies the ritualism critique, seeing human rights positives 
in µthe effects of ³just´ going >ritualistically@ through the motions’ of reporting 
procedures, in terms of repetitive reiterations producing a certain normative 
reality.119 
Thus, if some human rights rituals oblige states to act, in public forums and 
performances before their peers and others, as if they take their human rights 
obligations seriously,120 this might be worth something in the wider scheme of 
things. This may be especially true if the regulatory field in question is still 
emerging, as with BHR. That is, while the performance of implementation that 
accompanies state acceptance of a human rights treaty commitment may be or 
become ritualised performance, there may be µsome power inherent in the 
performative moment itself’.121 This is because the processes may afford rare 
opportunities for dialogue, reflection, sharing or learning, and pressure on 
abusive or neglectful state conduct.  
This would seem true especially where states’ participation and rhetorical 
commitment creates something for national and transnational civil society 
networks to follow up at home, including by invoking the norms to which the 
state has publicly given rhetorical commitment abroad.122 The ritualism critique 
would accept that states may commit to such regimes knowing that they are 
largely rhetorical, ritualistic and mainly harmless, in the sense of not threatening 
a state with reasons to avoid scrutiny of its human rights record. Yet they may, 
once on board the regime, become progressively socialised towards underlying 
regulatory objectives,123 internalising the substantive norms, or at least aspects of 
them, through participating even in a relatively µperfunctory’ manner in the 
rituals. By at least accepting and contributing to rhetorical human rights 
commitments, states may find it harder, in a legitimacy sense, to avoid altogether 
acting on them. Alternatively, whatever their position during negotiations and 
ratification, their participation in an ongoing treaty regime may be part  
                                                 
117  Charlesworth and Larking, µRegulatory Power’, above n 12, 9. This is also part of Cowan’s argument: see 
Cowan, above n 40, 52, 54±5. 
118  Kllin, above n 37, 33. 
119  Cowan, above n 40, 51±2. 
120  Authers et al, µPaper for The Rituals of Human Rights Workshop’, above n 12, 6. 
121  Ibid Authers et al, µIntroduction: The Rituals of Human Rights’, above n 12, 14. 
122  Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, µOn Compliance’ (1993) 47 International Organization 
175, 185±7. See also Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance 
with International Regulatory Agreements (Harvard University Press, 1995) Thomas Risse, Stephen C 
Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic 
Change (Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
123  Harold Hongju Koh, µHow Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?’ (1999) 74 Indiana Law 
Journal 1397, 1407. 
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of a process of µsocialisation’124 during which commitment to the substantive 
regulatory goals may build or be built. 
Participation in human rights treaty regimes is µnot always predicated on 
myth and ceremony’.125  Still, in principle it is hard to deny that the merely 
ceremonial dimensions of treaty membership and participation might be 
improved upon where forms of evaluation, assessment, peer review or complaint 
reduce the scope for disingenuous participation and raise the µlegitimacy costs’ 
and risks of being shown to deviate from one’s rhetorical, ceremonial or 
ritualised commitments. 126  States may participate in a regulatory regime in a 
perfunctory or even subversive manner to begin with, yet find themselves µdrawn 
into more meaningful commitments’ through their representatives’ experiences 
and their desire for peer acceptance and respect.127  
This accords with international relations scholarship on the normative and 
compliance-inducing effect of committing to multilateral regimes even absent 
sanctions for non-compliance and perhaps irrespective of the binding or non-
binding nature of the commitments. 128  Unless one adopts an extreme realist 
perspective it is difficult to deny that rhetorical, symbolic, formal, peer 
commitment to high standards may generate the conditions for gradual 
internalisation and foster peer convergence, learning and communication, 
capacity-building, and so on.129 The approach also resonates with µresponsive’ 
(and perhaps µnew governance’130) regulation theories, which posit that regulatory 
approaches are more effective, legitimate and coherent where they privilege 
dialogic, cooperative techniques to build participants’ capacity to comply and 
                                                 
124  See Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights through International 
Law (Oxford University Press, 2013). See also Bell’s discussion of Durkheim’s ideas of states becoming 
socialised through engagement with systems based on common values: Catherine Bell, Ritual: 
Perspectives and Dimensions (Oxford University Press, 2009) 24±5, referred to by Kllin, above n 37, 40. 
Bulto argues, without reference to this literature, that human rights ritualism may µenhance the 
socialisation’ of African states and their µeventual integration into a global culture of human rights’: 
Bulto, above n 33, 254. 
125  See Cole, above n 11, 1165. 
126  See Karolina Milewic] and Robert E Goodin, µDeliberative Capacity Building through International 
Organisations’ (Meeting Paper, American Political Science Association, 6 August 2012) 10±11 cited, in 
unpublished form, by Charlesworth and Larking, µRegulatory Power’, above n 12, 20. 
127  Charlesworth and Larking, µRegulatory Power’, above n 12, 20. See also Kllin, above n 37, 38±9. 
128  See especially Chayes and Chayes, µOn Compliance’, above n 122 Chayes and Chayes, New 
Sovereignty, above n 122 see also Peter M Haas, Robert O Keohane and Marc A Levy, µIntroduction’ in 
Peter M Haas, Robert O Keohane and Marc A Levy (eds), Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective 
International Environmental Protection (MIT Press, 1993) 1 Dinah Shelton (ed), Commitment and 
Compliance: The Role of Non-binding Norms in the International Legal System (Oxford University Press, 
2000). 
129  See Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds) The Persistent Power of Human Rights: 
From Commitment to Compliance (Cambridge University Press, 2013). Charlesworth and Larking note, 
not with reference to this literature, how involvement over time in a cooperative regime might induce 
internalisation by participants of the regime’s goals: Charlesworth and Larking, µRegulatory Power’, 
above n 12, 20. 
130  For some discussion of these theories in relation to BHR, see John Gerard Ruggie, µGlobal Governance 
and ³New Governance Theory´: Lessons from Business and Human Rights’ (2014) 20 Global 
Governance 5.  
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inclination to see the regulatory goals as in their own longer-term self-interest.131 
Such theories do not necessarily extend to the quality of compliance, or the 
mechanisms by which incremental commitment to the substantive goals of the 
treaty occurs as a matter of course. That is, although compliance may be the 
normal organisational posture associated with membership of a treaty regime that 
a state has gone to the trouble of engaging with, 132  this is not particularly 
encouraging if what counts as µcompliance’ is the fulfilment of formal procedural 
requirements marked by disjunction from substantive compliance and without 
internalising of the normative values. Ritualistic conformity may be more 
problematic in a regulatory project than outright resistance to that project 
resistance is a posture that at least conveys some degree of substantive 
engagement, as opposed to the non-engagement that might accompany 
perfunctory compliance. 
If rituals themselves are not necessarily problematic and are potentially 
productive of substantive human rights progress, the challenge becomes that of 
shifting state participants in the human rights system towards a committed 
position on the substantive aims of any particular instrument or regime. Indeed, 
Charlesworth’s project saw its µunderl>ying@’ question as being whether 
problematic human rights ritualism can be transformed into conformity or 
commitment.133 
Charlesworth’s project’s ultimate finding was that the scope for the UPR and 
human rights treaty procedures to transcend ritualism and act as empowering 
regulatory mechanisms µdepends heavily on effective NGO and civil society 
engagement’ in those processes.134 A treaty model might create space for what 
Charlesworth and colleagues saw as regular µproductive disruption’ through 
using human rights reporting (and other) rituals to escape and contradict 
deflective, unengaged ritualism, or it might not.135 The way in which a treaty is 
designed to incorporate roles for µdisruptive’ non-state actors, including national 
                                                 
131  For the classic articulation of responsive regulation theory, see Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, 
Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford University Press, 1992). For a 
recent overview, see John Braithwaite, µFasken Lecture: The Essence of Responsive Regulation’ (2011) 
44 University of British Columbia Law Review 475. Charlesworth’s research project discussed at above n 
12 drew on ideas of ritualism developed in the context of responsive regulation theory, principally by 
John Braithwaite.  
132  Chayes and Chayes, µOn Compliance’, above n 122, 179. 
133  Charlesworth and Larking, µRegulatory Power’, above n 12, 11. The authors cite Valerie Braithwaite’s 
typology of motivational postures adopted by subjects of regulation (µgame-playing’, µdisengagement’, 
µresistance’, µcapitulation’, and µcommitment’): Valerie Braithwaite, Defiance in Taxation and 
Governance: Resisting and Dismissing Authority in a Democracy (Edward Elgar, 2009) 77±9. See also 
Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite, above n 12, 295. For an alternative typology of regulatory posture, 
see Christine Oliver, µStrategic Responses to Institutional Processes’ (1991) 16 Academy of Management 
Review 145. See also influential theories of the range of responses to normative regimes in Robert K 
Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Free Press, 1968). The treaty debate in this field has not to 
date engaged with insights generated by any of these studies in considering what design of instrument 
might best achieve commitment to the overall objective. 
134  Charlesworth and Larking, µRegulatory Power’, above n 12, 16. 
135  Authers et al, µIntroduction: The Rituals of Human Rights’, above n 12, 14±15. Thus, civil society might 
be empowered by a state’s ratification even, or perhaps even especially, if the state fails then to 
implement it. 
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human rights institutions, civil society organisations, and the media, may 
therefore be crucial to outcomes.  
For us, then, the question would be how BHR treaty designs might shift 
states, over time, towards more committed, less perfunctory engagement by 
maximising or at least promoting the potential for disruption. Conceivably, an 
NAP-focused framework convention regime, by contrast with other treaty 
models, if it insisted on participatory, transparent and equitable procedures at 
national as well as international levels, and were based on the already widely 
accepted UNGPs, might provide more spaces, and more accessible deliberative 
nodes for state and non-state constituencies, for influencing transformation in the 
posture of a state towards its duties to regulate, in ways that substantively 
improve enjoyment of human rights.  
 
V   CONCLUSION 
While the µwhether to treaty’ question is by no means settled in the BHR 
field, the OEIWG’s institutional mandate in the Human Rights Council means 
that the µhow to treaty’ question is receiving greater attention. Multilateral 
treaties come in a wide variety of forms, and the risks of ritual performance are 
undoubtedly greater in some forms than others. Scope exists for exploring an 
effective, legitimate and coherent international regime with some compromise 
between µthe perfect and the good’136 without being trapped in models of the 
past.137 The premise of this article has been that post-2014 proposals for a BHR 
treaty have not sufficiently articulated or sought to incorporate definitions, 
criteria or theories of effectiveness. One important criterion, we suggest, is the 
need to avoid patterns of formalistic process-based compliance: µregulatory 
ritualism’. Our underlying research question has been whether, and to what 
extent, the successful negotiation of a dedicated instrument in the field of 
conduct covered by the UNGPs might, contrary to the promise of galvanising 
significant state action, raise the spectre of empty and falsely reassuring ritualism 
in state compliance. However, we have argued that compliance rituals (such as 
might accompany an NAP-based framework convention) are not necessarily 
without possible value in a longer-term effort to build consensus and 
convergence in this emerging area. 
Human rights treaties and other rituals have some transformative, consensus-
building potential. Yet it is a fine line, since ritualism is never far from rituals,138 
and the tendency to ritualism is intrinsic to human rights rituals notwithstanding 
                                                 
136  Harriet E Berg, µThe Perfect, the Good, and Unclear Conflict Lines’ on Business and Human Rights 
Resource Centre, Debate the Treaty <https://business-humanrights.org/en/the-perfect-the-good-and-
unclear-conflict-lines>. 
137  De Schutter, above n 52, 43. 
138  Kllin, above n 37, 39, 40. See also Shane Chalmers, µThe Beginning of Human Rights: The Ritual of 
Preamble to Law’ (2017) forthcoming Humanity <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractBid  
2707826>. Chalmers notes that while some rituals of human rights might be constructive, the universal 
broad language of rights coupled with the µconstant performance’ involved in human rights processes 
makes these regimes µever-vulnerable’ to ritualism: at 22. 
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their transformative potential. 139  If the ritualism risk does materialise in a 
significant way in the design of a proposed treaty on BHR, that process and its 
outcome may have constituted a serious opportunity cost on alternative measures 
to promote state operationalisation of the UNGPs and their related framework. 
Central to the ritualism critique is that the possible convening, socialisation, and 
rhetoric-to-obligation effects of treaty participation may hold some regulatory 
promise. However, the critique would maintain, certain patterns can risk 
overshadowing that promise or potential. These are the risks that, especially over 
time, repeat performances of formal procedures become seen as the point of the 
overall exercise, while giving false reassurance that states are acting 
substantively on their obligations, and while tending to occupy the political space 
for articulating the relevant human rights demands. 
Ritual performances that count as µcompliance’ not only enable participant 
states to lose sight of or to obscure the overall goal of promoting human rights 
standards. They may also promote a profound accountability paradox. This is that 
procedure-heavy systems ostensibly designed to publicise information, facilitate 
peer review and engender continuous improvement may in fact operate to 
obscure accountability. We would conclude that there is a reasonable risk of the 
ritualism problem materialising in relation to a comprehensive treaty on BHR. 
This is at least so in relation to any of the forms that would be likely to garner 
sufficient state support: as noted in our introduction, a value-adding treaty may 
not be viable, but a viable, undemanding treaty might add little value and 
represent mere ritualistic incantations about rights. Yet our brief exploration of 
the merits of a framework convention model, notwithstanding the ritualism risk 
we also identify with such a model, illustrates the need to qualify this ritualism 
critique. This is because the risk of ritualism might be traded off against the 
possible gains in terms of consensus-building, sharing and learning, and 
inclusivity in dialogue on addressing business-related human rights risks at inter-
state and national levels. 
In the introduction, we registered a caveat to the statement that our focus was 
not on whether any treaty at all was a good idea. This caveat was needed because 
many actors focused on negotiating a binding international instrument appear to 
place unfounded expectations on public international law as a regulatory 
medium,140 and ignore the realities and attractions of plural sources and modes of 
governance, 141  while confusing the means (treaties are only one kind of 
regulatory intervention) with the ends (greater enjoyment of human rights). 
International law is not a regulatory µsilver bullet’.142 On the other hand, treaty 
                                                 
139  Authers et al, µIntroduction: The Rituals of Human Rights’, above n 12, 14. 
140  See Brett Bowden, Hilary Charlesworth, and Jeremy Farrall (eds), The Role of International Law in 
Building Democracy and Justice after Conflict: Great Expectations (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
141  See John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 
Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J Biersteker, µThe Emergence of Private Authority in the International 
System’ in Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J Biersteker (eds), The Emergence of Private Authority in 
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 David Vogel, µPrivate Global Business 
Regulation’ (2008) 11 Annual Review of Political Sciences 261. 
142  Nolan, above n 51, 72 see generally Mares, above n 35. Ruggie has urged treaty proponents to free 
themselves from µconceptual shackles’ tied to fixed ideas about formal and public law as the only 
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sceptics’ calls for µpolycentric’ regulatory approaches in this field should not 
preclude an examination of what treaty design innovations might best promote or 
complement other sources of governance in the BHR’s overall regulatory 
µecosystem’.  
Nevertheless, one effect of accepting the risk of ritualism may be that the 
onus should be seen as shifting onto those advancing treaty proposals to explain 
how their models will avoid or contain that risk. This must be so in light of the 
empiricism of the more general treaty effectiveness literature, and the fact that 
states already have clear duties in the field of BHR, and no treaty negotiation is 
needed to ground these. In this sense, the ritualism critique may make it more 
difficult in this field to keep separate the questions of µhow to design a treaty’ 
from µwhether a viable treaty would add any value’. 
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